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pAbstract
Foreign development assistance has been widely used for the last 60 years. In spite
of changing conditions in the geopolitical scene and the increasing number of new
development actors, development assistance has retained its salience. Most countries
around the globe are involved in the aid regime, either as recipients, as donors and
frequently as both. Middle-income countries (MICs) that until recently were recipients
of aid, today are rivalling traditional donors practices.
Despite MICs’ economic growth rates, the distribution of income is extremely
unequal. Pockets of wealth are surrounded by oceans of poverty, and yet they are
actively increasing their development assistance offer. If middle-income countries still
have domestic challenges to overcome, why do they engage in the provision of
development assistance? While some argue that MICs use it to advance foreign
policy interests in the same way that traditional donors do, this work will put forward
that elements unique to these countries, such as the desire to reaffirm themselves as
global actors, strongly drive their South-South cooperation policies.
This paper aims to answer the question of why MICs offer development assistance
through the study of Latin American cooperation policies. For this purpose, the
author proposes to build a typology based on the motivations of traditional donors,
which will facilitate the comparison of traditional and emerging donors’ practices.
This analysis will be supported by a combination of IR approaches. The implications
of this work include deeper understanding of the drivers of development assistance
policies and providing elements to extend similar studies to other MICs.Introduction
Official development assistance (or foreign aid) emerged as a mechanism to promote
economic development in the 1950sa. What began as an act of diplomatic solidarity
and temporary relief in the aftermath of the Second World War, by the 1990s had
acquired such salience that most industrialised nations had structured aid policies,
established aid agencies and joined the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). At the begin-
ning of the new Millennium, foreign aid had become a norm rather than the exception
in the industrialised world (Lancaster 2007: 13).
A gradual and steady rise of official development assistance (ODA) flows has been
observed over the last 60 yearsb. During most of this period, developed countries (or
traditional donors) provided the main share of global ODA3. This tendency started to2015 Robledo; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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Robledo Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:3 Page 2 of 16change by the late 1990s and emerging donors (or non-DAC donors) increased their
participation. Countries that not long ago were recipients of ODA today are becoming
important development contributorsd. Robust macroeconomic conditions in most of
MICs give them large marge of manoeuvre to channel resources to South-South
Cooperation (SSC) flowse. South-South Cooperation has become a mechanism of
assertive foreign policy used by new donors to gain political and economic influence,
that at the same time, is embedded in a discourse of solidarity, complementarity and
lack of hierarchy (Abdenur and Fonseca 2013: 1477).
According to the aid research and database Aiddata.org, 38 non-DAC donors have
been identifiedf. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are particu-
larly active, with their policies acquiring extended geographical outreach and the size
and sectorial diversity of their programs growing. Similarly, Mexico, Indonesia, South
Korea, Turkey, Chile, Thailand, the Gulf Countries and even Cuba and Venezuela are
active providers of development assistance. While these countries share dynamic
economies, colonial past, common challenges and the experience of having been re-
cipients of aid, they also constitute a heterogeneous group with diverse practices
(Rowlands 2012). These elements along with strong emphasis on respect for the prin-
ciples of non-interference and national sovereignty, rejection of hierarchy and the
pursuit of common benefits lie at the core of new development partners’ activities
(Mawdsley 2012: 152).
Due to a lack of reliable records and the absence of a common definition of ODA-
like flows, exact financial data on the contributions to international development by
emerging donors are unknown. Some estimates show that South-South development
flows have significantly grown in the last decade (Kindornay et al. 2013). Davies (2010)
suggests that in 2008 the expenditure by new donors was equivalent to 10 to 15 per
cent of DAC donors’ ODA. Park (2011) notes that in 2008 ODA-like flows from China,
Turkey, Korea and Saudi Arabia were around 12 per cent of global ODA and he also
projects that such contributions will reach 20 per cent by 2015. Callan et al. (2013)
believe that ODA-like flows from emerging donors are around 10 per cent of global
contributions and will double by 2020.
The so-called new donors have a double identity, as donors and as recipients, which
exposes the numerous domestic challenges that they still face (Quadir 2013: 332).
Economic growth registered by most of MICs does not appear to spill down to all sec-
tors of the populationg. Small groups live in opulent conditions, while the vast majority
remain submerged under the poverty line. Massive public protests recently witnessed
in Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, reflect continued economic
marginalisation and discontent within large sectors of the population. The contrast of
burgeoning middle classes against the 74 per cent of population living under US$1.25 a
day and the 79 per cent of the population under US$2 a day that are concentrated in
MICs, demonstrates the rampant growth of inequality (Sumner 2013: 358). This chal-
lenge of poverty and inequality is particularly noticeable in Latin America. Although
government efforts to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality have been very intense,
35 per cent of Latin Americans still live in conditions of poverty and more than 80
million (equivalent to 13 per cent of total population) still live under extreme poverty,
leaving Latin America as one of the most unequal regions of the world (World Bank
2013: 9, 22)h.
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global governance are the ones that have the most unequal domestic societies (Gray
and Murphy 2013: 190). In brief, MICs still have numerous development demands to
fulfil and limited resources for such purposes, and yet they are increasing their offer
of foreign assistance. This raises the question of how to explain the rising levels of
MICs development assistance, given that they still face a myriad of domestic
challenges.
Academic literature discusses that motivations behind development assistance vary
from a wide range of reasons between pure humanitarian altruism to the selfish pursuit
of the national interesti. In practice, the purpose of foreign assistance is frequently a
combination resulting from what Huntington describes, as a conflict between the moral
obligation of the donor and the desire to advance its national interest (1970: 174). But
since these arguments result from the analysis of traditional donors (Lancaster 2007;
Van der Veen 2011; Lundsgaarde 2012), can we claim that the same applies to non-
DAC donors?
It appears that the rationale of development cooperation offered by MICs is indeed not
far from that of industrialised states: development assistance serves as an instrument of for-
eign policy (Haan 2009). Emerging countries are pushing their way onto the global stage
and challenging Western dominance in different domains. With increased frequency, devel-
oping countries host international meetings, present candidacies for international positions
or institutionalise alternate groupings (including G77, ALBA, BRICS or IBSA). Further ef-
forts are also given to seek larger share markets and to be active in world politics.
To achieve these objectives, MICs need to win allies. SSC seems to have become one of
the preferred mechanisms for developing countries to acquire support and to increase
their influence in the international scene (Woods 2005; Kragelund 2008; Brautigam 2009;
Mawdsley 2012; Quadir 2013; Burges 2014). In similar ways to industrialised countries,
emerging donors have recognised the virtues of development assistance as a useful tool to
advance foreign policy interests. But in addition to geopolitical considerations, there are
specific logics to SSC that are not necessarily mirroring broader power struggles (Abdenur
and Fonseca 2013: 1488). Elements unique to new development partners, stemmed from
their idiosyncrasies, history, cultural heritage and national identity also shape deeply their
development assistance policies and practices, for instance, the need to reaffirm their
sovereignty, to acquire economic autonomy, as well as, to consolidate regional or global
leadership.
This paper aims to explain these elements. After the introduction and background, a
typology of development assistance based on the motivations of traditional donors will
be presented. These categories result from the analysis of traditional donors policies
and will be used to understand and compare the motivations driving new donors. The
analysis will be made under the lens of several streams of international relations theory,
IPE and post-colonial theory. In the following section, I will analyse Latin America SSC
practices. The choice of case study is grounded in the long-standing Latin American
tradition of international cooperation and solidarity. The region has been the cradle of
several SSC landmarks and in the last decade SSC has re-emerged and reinforced its
role as an essential element of intra-regional relations (Morazán et al. 2011)j. The paper
will finish with a brief conclusion summarizing the main arguments outlined and will
note some avenues for further research.
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The appearance of numerous new development actors, along with the unprecedent
rise of ODA and ODA-like flows, demonstrates that foreign assistance has not com-
pletely lost its relevance. As such, there is an increasing amount of academic studies
dedicated to it. For the most part, the current academic debate focuses on the effect-
iveness of aid and the aid-development paradigm, overlooking aspects such as the
motivations of non-DAC donors, which will be adressed by this paper. Scholars of
international relations have used several approaches to understand the motivations
that drive traditional ODA: Morgenthau (1962: 308), Mason (1964: 107), Huntington
(1970: 171), Thorbecke (2000: 13), Lancaster (2007: 2; Lancaster 2008: 46), Haan
(2009: 194) and Herbert (2012: 70) agree that development per se is one of the
purposes of ODA, but is not the only one, and rarely the predominant one as we will
see next.
In realist terms, foreign aid is considered as an instrument to advance the na-
tional interest, which in this case is understood in terms of power and geostrategic
interests (Morgenthau 1962: 301; Hook 1993: 34). Realism bases its analysis on the
anarchical nature of the international system and states struggle for survival. States
seek to obtain and maintain power, which realists understand as the military cap-
abilities required to ensuring the subsistence of the state (Hollis and Smith 1990).
Morgenthau (1962: 301) contends that foreign aid is an integral part of foreign
policy, and it should thus be used as an element of the political weaponry of a
country. For Morgenthau, foreign assistance can help to accomplish ends that mili-
tary force or traditional diplomacy cannot. The neorealist definition of power and
security includes also the combined capabilities of the state (Hollis and Smith
1990; Hook 1993: 16; Wendt 1995: 73; Schraeder et al. 1998: 3; Ayllón 2006: 16).
Thus in neorealist views, foreign assistance should also serve to the advancement
of states’ economic power.
The realist and neorealist approaches present some limitations for the study of
foreign aid. To start, the only actors considered as members of the international
community are states, excluding other influential agents, such as international orga-
nisations, transnational corporations and non-government organisations (NGOs).
Second, realist theories do not give enough attention to domestic factors, which in
public policy play a significant role. And finally, realism and neorealism do not con-
sider moral values, ideas or social structures that influence human and state
behaviour.
Followers of the liberal tradition argue that ODA is a reflection of the state’s desire to
collaborate against global challenges (Lancaster 2007: 4; Haan 2009: 64). Nations enter
into cooperative behaviour because they recognise the benefits they gained by partici-
pating in networks and international regimes (Cooper and Flemes 2013: 948). They
see international structures as favourable for a prosperous and peaceful world order
and as suitable spaces for negotiation and cooperation (Hindess 2004: 3; Mawdsley
2012). Liberals believe that interventions in favour of global order are justified be-
cause aid is considered as a contribution to global public goods (GPGs). Besides, aid
conditionality is accepted because aid is used as a ‘legitimate’ instrument to promote
democratic regimes and free market economies in the developing world that eventually
will bring global benefits.
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eradication of pandemics or environment preservation, are good examples that illus-
trate the approach of IPE to international development assistance. GPGs overlap in the
international and national levels, encompass economic and political interests and at the
same time entail market mechanisms and state regulation. IPE on one hand perceives
that aid is determined by economic interests pushed by lobby groups, by the national
interest of states and by the bargaining process within the state structure (Hopkins
Hindess 2004). Similar to the liberal approach, the aid regime is seen as an arena
for interstate cooperation that facilitates contacts, provides information and sets
the conditions to achieve common goals (Martin 1999). Due to the overflowing
benefits produced by public goods, it is in the interest of rich nations to channel
ODA to contain pandemics or to fight climate change in poor countries that do
not have the resources or the willingness to do so. Promoters of this approach
argue that the international community should be interested in supporting poorer
countries to have access to GPGs not only for altruist reasons but to enable them
to contribute to public goods in the future (Kaul et al. 1999). Furthermore, when
donors offer foreign aid for the provision of GPGs, the national constituency
within the donor country benefits too, which makes domestic justification of
ODA easier (UNIDO 2008).
Under the constructivist lens, foreign assistance is read as a set of norms and ideas
constructed by states. Constructivism emerged when neorealist theories seemed unable
to explain the causes of such international events (Price and Reus-Smit 1998). Wendt
indicates that one of the differences between neorealists and constructivists rests in the
assumption that for the former the structure of the international relations system is
made of material capabilities, whereas for the latter it also includes social relationships
(1995: 73). David Lumsdaine, the main supporter of this interpretation, sustains that
foreign aid cannot only be explained on the basis of economic and political interests of
donors; humanitarian convictions and moral values equally shape aid policies (1993:
29). In other words, foreign aid is influenced not only by international norms, but also
by the ‘ethical’ behaviour of states.
Official development assistance is a good example of how ideas and beliefs can be
institutionalised in international norms and regimes. Riddell (2007) observes that under
the basis of moral obligation and international solidarity, foreign aid became the ‘right’
(and expected) thing to do to address human suffering, because of the capabilities of
developed countries and the growing gap between rich and poor nations. Eventually,
foreign aid practices turned into a widespread institutionalised norm: “…rich countries
are expected to help poor countries to improve the social wellbeing of their popula-
tions” (Lancaster 2007: 61; Lancaster 2008: 59). This behaviour consolidated itself as a
moral duty and was reinforced by the desire for a good reputation from North
countries.
While liberal schools, international political economy and constructivism include in
their analysis other actors aside from states, they also present some limitations to the
study of ODA. Liberals downplay the importance of domestic factors, as a result of
its narrow focus based in international interactions (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995: 61).
Constructivists and international political economy do not give enough importance
to geostrategic interests that in fact are still very significant in aid allocations.
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exploitation (Lancaster 2008: 3; Haan 2009: 3). Marxists stress that ODA perpetuates
the North-South division between rich and poor countries. Structuralists denounce that
the capitalist model promoted by the West entails a trade system in which rich coun-
tries exploit poor nations (Pollock et al. 2001: 16), and therefore, ODA only perpetuates
the structural dominance of the centre over the periphery. For the proponents of these
schools, bilateral ODA should be substituted by multilateral assistance (Hook 1995;
Schraeder et al. 1998: 3-4). Marxist theories challenge the legitimacy of foreign assistance
and claim that it should be ended. In their interpretation, if there were any development
programs, they should be managed and implemented by renewed democratic inter-
national organisations.
Conversely, Cammack (2001) notes that efforts towards poverty alleviation promoted
by Western countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) are rooted in a
global capitalist strategy. Since the early 1990s, IFIs engaged in the implementation of
structural adjustment programs that focused more on the creation of a favourable en-
vironment for global capitalism than in promoting economic development. Cammack
(2004: 190) affirms that while the World Bank is committed to poverty alleviation, its
intentions and development programs are subordinated to capitalist principles. Critics
of Marxist theories contend that the introduction to industrialisation and modernity by
colonial powers and the insertion in the globalisation process is however beneficial for
poor countries (Sachs 2005). Marxism is useful to expose the hierarchical nature of the
international system and the domination of transnational capitalist classes. But it may
not be fully adequate to explain the motivations of foreign assistance policies, since
Marxists consider that the expansion of capitalism and the preservation of exploitation
regimes are the only incentives driving foreign aid policies. Moreover, Marxism does
not leave either margin to ponder the effects of identity, values and beliefs on public
policies.
Closely aligned with Marxist and dependency schools, postcolonial theory argues that
Western institutions impose neoliberal conditions favorable to global capitalism. ODA
is, offered as a ‘gift’ that reinforces the hierarchical position of North-South relations
and that reaffirms the sphere of influence of dominant countries. Post-colonial theorist
affirm that poor countries are led into poverty by a global system based on market
expansion, in which industrialised countries (the centre) receive all the benefits. Poor
nations are still subordinated to their former masters through new local elites and the
policies of international financial institutions. Nkrumah condensed this vision as
follows: “The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in
the theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty.
In reality its economic system and thus political policy is directed from outside” (Sethi
2011). When foreign aid is considered as a gift, development assistance is embedded in
a discourse constructed for such a purpose (Kapoor 2008: 91). For instance, development
discourse defines Third World population as underdevelopment and uncultured, while the
Industrialised World is defined as developed and superior; hence, the industrialised world
represents the model that poor countries must aspire to accomplish (Selby 2007; Nair
2013). Postcolonial theory mainly concentrates its analysis on discourse; whereas it brings
useful tools for a clearer understanding of foreign aid, discourse on its own cannot explain
the motivations of ODA.
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itional aid motivations has been briefly presented. As noted, ODA motivations are
dynamic, intertwined with each other and rarely a single reason dictates ODA. In the
words of Hook (1995: 167), “foreign aid takes the shape of its container” and therefore
it should be analysed under different lenses. Due to the multidimensional nature of
foreign aid and to the diversity of new actors, the best alternative for the study of ODA
is a combined theoretical approach, in which geostrategic allocations, the weight of
ideas, values and identity, the impact of norms and regimes, the influence of economic
interests, the desire of collaboration and the analysis of the current capitalist system
are all considered.Typology of oda motivations
The following typology will present the variety of outcomes of traditional aid and at the
same time will help to identify the different modalities of development cooperation
delivered by non-DAC donors. Based on the theoretical lenses above, ODA can be then
classified in the following categories:
Political-diplomatic
This kind of aid is the one offered in exchange of political or diplomatic leverage. Alesina
and Dollar (2000: 46) point out that foreign assistance from the US, Japan, France,
Germany and the UK ‘buys’ UN votes. France, Portugal and the UK offer development as-
sistance to consolidate their sphere of influence in former colonial territories (Mason
1964). Under this category it is also included what some consider as ‘cultural aid’, which
refers to aid offered to promote language, traditions, heritage, social structures or ideology,
to expand religion or assist diasporas (Lancaster 2007: 15). Countries with colonial ties,
such as France, Portugal, Spain, Italy and the UK are prone to offer this kind of assistance;
though, its main goal is to reinforce political alliances or to increase spheres of influence.
France is probably the country that has best used cultural aid. It has taken advantage
of colonial ties and cultural heritage to reaffirm its magnetic field in francophone
Africa, the Middle East and the Caribbean (Hook 1993; Schraeder et al. 1998: 11-15).
Policy makers tend to incorporate French values in ODA policies to ensure the dissem-
ination of French culture and to position the country at the ‘front rank’. During the
Cold War, these cultural features helped to maintain the French non-alignment strategy
and reinforce alliances with African countries.
Security-military
Foreign assistance for military aid is the one advanced to extend or strengthen donors’
security. In the views of Morgenthau (1962: 303), it is offered to buttress alliances.
Huntington (1971: 130) and Van der Veen (2011: 10) agree that countries deliver devel-
opment assistance to enhance physical security. According to Lasensky (2003), donors
seek military advantages in exchange for aid, for example, to establish or use military
bases (e.g. in Turkey and Pakistan), to create military alliances (e.g. with Israel and
Egypt) or to contain the expansion of communist regimes (e.g. in Korea and Vietnam).
US foreign aid is known by its geostrategic drivers. But after the 9/11 attacks, the UK
also stepped up its development allocations to countries perceived as allies, for example
Pakistan, as well as, to countries perceived as threats such as, Iraq or Afghanistan
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of military aid to friendly regimes in former African colonies (Schraeder et al. 1998: 12).
Humanitarian
Humanitarian aid is extended to alleviate human suffering and to protect human
welfare in crisis provoked by natural or man-made disastersk. It is usually provided on
short-term basis. Morgenthau (1962: 301) considers humanitarian assistance as the only
kind of aid that is selfless and non-political. According to Hook (1993: 24), during the
Cold War Sweden used foreign assistance as a strategy to emphasize its autonomy from
superpowers, even though it was argued that Swedish aid was structured on humanitar-
ian basis.
Huntington (1970: 175) and Heinrich (2013: 423-424) agree that humanitarian aid is
most persuasive when domestic back up exists. Heinrich further observes that humani-
tarian crises are more likely to be reported in domestic media. When citizens are aware
of disasters or crises, they are more inclined to support the aid efforts of their
governments.
Altruistic or developmental
Altruistic aid is the one that seeks to enhance economic development. According to
Lumsdaine (1993: 38), this kind of aid is the sort of assistance offered with the pure ob-
jective of improving the quality of life. Altruistic aid is usually offered on soft-terms
and in long-term basis. Morgenthau (1962: 304) refers to it as ‘aid for economic devel-
opment’ and Hook (1995) labels it under ‘aid welfare’. The difference between humani-
tarian and altruistic aid is that the former is provided in emergency situations and its
interventions are punctual, while the latter seeks sustained development with long-term
interventions.
This is probably the most difficult category to justify in the eyes of domestic constitu-
encies: how can governments explain aid policies to promote economic development in
other countries? Lumsdaine (1993: 64) suggests that “[public] support for aid stemmed
from the same sources as attempts to provide for the poor at home”. Altruistic assist-
ance is characteristic of the model applied by any country with solid welfare systems
and substantial civil society engagement (Hopkins 2000: 331; Haan 2009: 33; Shaw
2011: 7).
Commercial
Aid under this category is the sort of foreign assistance that donors extend with the
objective of obtaining economic benefits. Schraeder et al. (1998: 9), Woods (2005: 401),
Lancaster (2007: 14-15) and Van der Veen (2011: 10) note that commercial foreign
assistance directly contributes to the economy of the donor by expanding export mar-
kets, providing access to raw materials, offering energy supplies or promoting foreign
investment. Due to its nature and the related procurement conditions this form of
ODA is often referred as ‘tied aid’. The most relevant example in this category is
Japan, whose economic interests are the core drivers of its aid. Economic prosperity
of neighbours is critical to Japanese economic growth and therefore its aid concen-
trates in the Asia-Pacific Rim. The business community and the Ministry of Trade
and Industry have great influence on ODA policy-making and so Japanese aid allocations
tend to be heavily tied compared to other DAC-donors (Mason 1964; Huntington 1970:
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allocations bringing economic benefits to donor countries.
Prestige
Prestige aid occurs when donors offer ODA to gain reputation and respect or to reflect
certain identity in the international community. Morgenthau (1962: 304) suggests that
prestige aid may bring political returns. Donors tend to offer this variant of aid to improve
their image and compensate for previous ‘wrong doing’ (Bauer 2000: 72; Kragelund 2008:
580). Prestige aid can become generous when it contributes to the provision of GPGs
helping donors portray themselves as ‘good global citizens’ and ‘generous nations’ (Herbert
2012: 82-83; Mawdsley 2012: 149). In this case, development assistance represents the
means for smaller countries to affirm themselves as members of the international
community. Prestige aid is also used to project a positive image in the face of domestic
constituencies in donor countries (Eyben and Savage 2012).
There are several cases of development assistance provided by non-DAC donors that
are motivated in similar ways than traditional ODA and that fit into this typology. For
instance, Taiwan uses aid to seek international recognition, in the same way that China of-
fered foreign assistance to get a seat in the UN Security Council in the 1960s (Kragelund
2008: 570-571). Venezuela tries to contest Brazilian leadership and US hegemony in the
Americas, as well as, challenging Western global dominance through its development co-
operation program (Burges 2007; Mawdsley 2012: 167); whereas Cuba sought to promote
Third World solidary and anti-US support (Ojeda 2010). Emerging donors, such as Brazil,
China and India, conceive foreign assistance entwined with commercial interests (Naím
2007; Kragelund 2008: 573-574; Woods 2008: 14). Some new donors also offer develop-
ment assistance to countries with shared cultural heritage to strengthen political relations,
for instance, Mexico to Central America and Brazil to other Portuguese speaking nations
(Ayllón and Surasky 2010; Shaw 2011: 7). Moreover, development assistance from Arab
donors is frequently channelled to promote Islam (Kragelund 2008: 565).
As earlier noted, in addition to the traditional use of development cooperation as an
instrument to advance foreign policy interests, there are elements that shape deeply the
development assistance strategies of new donors. To further expand this argument,
Latin American development assistance will be presented next.Why do Latin American MICs provide development assistance?
Latin American cooperation started during the implementation of the import-substitution
industrialisation model (ISI) in the 1950s. In his famous manifesto, Prebisch posited that
the ISI model was key to overcoming economic imbalances, such as the deterioration of
terms of trade in the region (Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC - CEPAL)
(1950)). But to stimulate and maintain economic impetus, reasonable sized markets and
technological capabilities were needed. For these purposes, Prebisch argued that economic
integration would enable developing countries to take advantage of the economies of scale
offered by larger markets, as well as, fostering technical and knowledge exchange (Couto
2007: 51).
Although, the ISI model started as the theoretical foundation for industrialisation
policies in Latin America, its logic was politically expanded to become the ideological
foundation for opposing intervention in the region (Flechsig 1991: 94-95). When Africa
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had fallen under the sphere of influence of the USA both through its hegemony in the
Organisation for American States (OAS) and via the imposition of military dictatorships
in the continent. It was the Cuban revolution that brought Latin American voices afloat
and identified them with the resistance movements in Asian and African countries. In the
wake of the Bandung Conference there were two parallel Third-world manifestations: Asia
and Africa against colonial powers and Latin American against US dominance. (Young
2006: 15-17). These movements eventually crossed paths in the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) and the G77.
The Bandung Conference was the first step that countries in the periphery took to
challenge the dominant system and sought to restructure inequalities and eliminate the
North and South gap (Golub 2013: 1004). As developing countries began looking for
autonomous models of economic growth, SSC appeared as a space for the exchange of
experiences, knowledge, technology, resources and know-how that fostered the develop-
ment of national capabilities. For practical reasons, SSC tends to initially occur among
neighbours, but progress in communication technologies later facilitates exchanges
between countries in different continents. South-South cooperation is seen to offer
alternatives that are more suitable to the context of poor countries: new donors have
faced similar challenges, and therefore poor countries are more likely to mirror the
models and solutions implemented by them, than those offered by traditional donors
(Park 2011: 39).
New donors promote the discourse of solidarity and mutual benefits as founding
stones of their SSC, when at the same time foreign policy interests underpin such
initiatives. Sanahuja (Roy and Andrade 2010) contends that SSC has become a dis-
tinctive feature of self-legitimisation in Latin America. But as pointed by Fernando
Nivia (Morazán et al. 2011: 24), Latin American development providers tend to exag-
gerate altruistic discourse when in reality SSC clearly underlines foreign policy
objectives.
Latin American South-South development cooperation policies are not only the re-
sult of common challenges or shared heritage. The identity and history of are also
strong drivers of cooperation policies. Developing countries rarely seek to maintain
colonial influence, to buttress military alliances or to provide assistance as a result of
guilt or moral obligation. Instead, emerging donors use SSC to promote regional in-
tegration, obtain self-legitimation, consolidate regional or global leadership, acquire
self-sufficiency, obtain non-alignment, maintain or strengthen national sovereignty,
preserve regional autonomy, promote regional solidarity and increase leverage in
international organisations, as we will see.
Regional integration is not only focused on trade; for developing countries it has a
more comprehensive approach, such as seen in the Mesoamerica Project. It is a co-
operation initiative promoting political dialogue and coordinating development pro-
jects between Mexico, nine Central American countries and Colombia. The emphasis
is on communication and transport infrastructure, energy supply and (of course)
trade facilitation. But it also includes joint efforts to enhance the provision of regional
public goods and improve health, housing and environment standardsl. Other exam-
ples of regional integration motivated by development cooperation in Latin America
are ALBA, MERCOSUR and UNASUR (Golub 2013: 1011)m.
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ship and as providers of public goods on the global scene. Chile aspires to be perceived as
a contributor to global governance sharing its experience of transition to democracy and
institutional building (Santander Campos 2010: 108). Similarly, Colombia uses SSC to im-
prove its international image and to be seen as a leader on the development assistance
agenda debate, especially by focusing, on its experiences in fighting organised crime and
governance building (Nivia-Ruiz 2010).
Latin American countries use SSC to strengthen their regional and global leadership.
For instance, Brazilian foreign policy under former president Lula aimed at consolidat-
ing the country as the natural leader of South America and to expand such leadership
to the international scene (Burges 2013; Merke 2013: 6); as a result, SSC became a tac-
tical device of Brazilian foreign policy (Inoue and Vaz 2012: 513). Likewise, Venezuela,
especially under the Chavez administration, sought to strengthen its international leader-
ship in the energy sector. Energy and self-sufficiency are key elements of the Venezuelan
petro-cooperation strategy, as it is commonly known (Ojeda 2010). The petro-cooperation
model is based on oil both as source of funds and as a key element of technological
transfers, knowledge sharing, training and investment.
Latin American MICs also use SSC as a means to reduce economic dependency and
consolidate their autonomy. Cuba, for example, a small island with poor natural endow-
ment and having suffered the embargo lead by the US, had to find its own way to promote
economic growth and foster economic self-reliance. For this purpose, Cuba engaged in
the development of its own capabilities and sought help from other developing countries
in exchange of SSC (Ojeda 2010). This cooperation model consists in Cuba offering tech-
nical assistance or training, in exchange of resources or technology (for example, Cuban
medical services in return of Venezuelan or African oil).
Some Latin American development cooperation initiatives have non-alignment as
their main objective and seek to challenge Western dominance. These schemes give de-
veloping countries choices beyond partnerships with powerful nations or with capitalist
interests. At the same time, these options help MICs to protect their sovereignty
(Mukherjee 2012: 266). For instance, Proyecto Mesoamerica, the Mexico-Chile fund,
Banco do Sul, the IBSA fund and the new BRICS bank were conceived as alternatives
to the IMF and WB to fund development projects in the South.
Brazil has used SSC to win allies and to increase its leverage in international organi-
sations. Brazil, as well as other emerging economies, such as India and South Africa,
actively fosters coalitions within international fora to undermine Western dominance,
for example, the WTO Doha round and the UN climate change conference (Flemes in
Roy and Andrade 2010: 15; Burges 2013). Moreover, Brazil is not shy about its aspirations
to get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and its SSC policy is perceived as be-
ing directed towards this goal, in case the said reform succeeds (Walz and Ramachandran
2011: 16). In brief, development assistance is for MICs a mechanism to win a seat in the
table of negotiations.
Finally, SSC gives development partners a way of self-legitimisation. Supporters of
SSC argue that it has a more developmental approach than traditional aid since it does
not focus only on poverty alleviation and because it is less self-interested. Developing
countries claim that SSC is offered on the basis of equality and not as a hierarchical im-
position from dominant partners. Echoing the principles emerged from Bandung, SSC
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interference and promoting larger ownership in recipient countries (Roussel 2013)n. In
addition, SSC providers contend that it is more cost-effective and more suitable to the
conditions of recipients than traditional North-South schemes (Sanahuja in Roy and
Andrade 2010: 19; Burges 2012: 235). To sum up, while SSC in the 1950s and 1960s
focused on exchanging industrial expertise, today Latin American cooperation is
driven by a broad range of factors that expose diverse motivations.
Conclusions
This paper has presented the practices of Latin American donors to contribute to better
understanding of the development cooperation policies of new donors. Traditional ODA
and new development cooperation are useful instruments of foreign policy since first ap-
pearance and have become increasingly more salient, for both DAC and non-DAC donors.
Development cooperation is influenced by the international and domestic context, the
self-perception and the international image of states, the domestic public support and
local lobbies, the national structure and international current affairs, as well as, national
identity, history and cultural heritage. These last tend to be more accentuated in the policy
making of new development partners rather than in traditional donors’ policies.
New donors have found in SSC a means to reach goals considered essential to their
survival. There are very clear examples among new development partners of the use of
SSC to pursue their national interest in realist terms, as well as, non-material goals,
such as the acquisition of prestige, recognition, respect and membership. Emphasis is
on the fact that this sort of elements is strongly manifest in the practices of new do-
nors. As this article has argued, the shape of SSC policies stems from the deep influ-
ence of national factors such as identity, cultural heritage, colonial past and national
idiosyncrasy in the policy-making process.
At first sight, SSC in Latin America appears to be mainly determined by the senti-
ment of solidarity and friendship with neighbours. Common language, culture and his-
tory bring these nations naturally together. Although, Latin American SSC could be
associated to prestige, far beyond the desire of recognition, SSC in the region has be-
come an instrument of self-reaffirmation, self-reliance, integration and more important,
opposition to foreign intervention. As in the past ISI era, SSC presents an opportunity
for MICs not only for strengthening their foreign relations, but also to develop national
capabilities and spur economic development.
Latin American SSC strategies display particular traits resulting from cultural homo-
geneity and relative cohesion of the region. Shared colonial experience, vulnerability to
neoliberal globalisation, rejection of hierarchies, common challenges and experiences,
respect of non-interference and sovereignty principles and pursuit of mutual benefits
are some of the characteristics that are also present in the policies of other Southern
providers (e.g. India, South Africa, Turkey) (Mawdsley 2012: 152). The differences be-
tween the practices and modalities of new development partners and traditional donors
are unmistakable. By the same token, the heterogeneous nature and diverse identity of
emerging donors makes it difficult to draw generalisations based on only few cases.
This paper has briefly presented some of the major characteristics of Latin American
SSC with the purpose to further understand Latin American donors as a stepping stone
to extend similar research on other development partners.
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the international system. Development assistance has been surpassed by other sources
of funding, and while it is still crucial for global development efforts, a renewed aid
architecture including new actors and modalities is needed. The participation of Southern
providers and SSC experiences bring added value to the table of negotiations. Better un-
derstanding of new donors, brought by further analysis of their development cooperation
policies, can only be beneficial for a stronger engagement and closer collaboration among
all stakeholders of a renewed development assistance paradigm.
Endnotes
aFor the purpose of this paper and to avoid repetition foreign aid and official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) from traditional donors are used interchangeably.
bOECD 2012. Is it ODA? Paris, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment 4. ODA refers to those flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of recipi-
ents and to multilateral development institutions, which are provided by official agencies
to favour the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries. It
should be concessional and should contain a grant element of at least 25 per cent.
cOECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm, accessed on 29 October 2013.
Traditional donors or DAC-donors refer to the 28 countries members of the OECD-
DAC, with the exceptions of some late comers such as Korea and the new members of
the European Union.
dOECD, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist, accessed on 14 November 2013. Emerging
donors refers to middle-income countries that are part of the DAC list of ODA recipients
and have become development providers.
eUNDP, http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/what_is_ssc.html, accessed on 05
December 2013. UNDP defines South-South cooperation as a broad framework for
collaboration among countries of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural,
environmental and technical domains. Therefore, development assistance between
developing countries is considered as SSC.
fhttp://aiddata.org/, accessed on 4 August 2014.
gWorld Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/
MX-BR-CN-IN-ID-TR-ZA?display=default accessed on 17 July 2014. The average growth
rate of MICs between 2004 and 2013 is 6.3% (annual growth rate of GDP, based on 2005
constant US dollars).
hWorld Bank, http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/LAC, accessed on 10
July 2014. According to the World Bank, a US$4 a day moderate poverty line is more
appropriate for the prevailing costs of living in the LAC region.
iThe national interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in re-
lation to other sovereign states. Nuechterlein D. E. 1976. National Interests and Foreign
Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making. British Journal of
International Studies 2(3):246-266.
jBuenos Aires Plan of Action, 1978; Caracas Plan of Action for Economic Cooperation
between Developing Countries, 1981; San Jose Plan of Action, 1997; High-level event on
South-South Cooperation and Capacity Development in Bogota, 2010; First High-level
meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in Mexico
City, 2013.
Robledo Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:3 Page 14 of 16kOECD, http://www.oecd.org/site/dacsmpd11/glossary.htm, accessed on 9 January 2014.
lAMEXCID, http://amexcid.gob.mx/index.php/ique-es-el-proyecto-mesoamerica, accessed
9 January 2014; Proyecto Mesoamerica, http://www.proyectomesoamerica.org/, accessed 9
January 2014.
mAlianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance of the
People of the Americas), portalalba.org. ALBA members are: Antigua and Barbuda,
Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, St Vincent and the Granadines and
Venezuela.
Mercado Común del Sur, http://www.mercosur.int/. MERCOSUR members are:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela.
nhttps://bcc-cuny.digication.com/MWHreader/Bandung_Declaration, accessed 21 July
2014.
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